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Perception and Reality in Congressional
Earmarks
Michael H. Crespin, Charles J. Finocchiaro, and Emily O. Wanless

Abstract
Earmarks added to appropriations bills have generated a considerable amount of attention
from the media, politicians, and fiscal watchdog groups. Taken as a whole, three “truths” about
earmarks are frequently discussed: 1) earmarks are the reason for large budget deficits, 2) using
omnibus legislation instead of regular order leads to more earmarks, and 3) “airdropped” earmarks
added at the conference stage compound the problem of pork. In this paper, we examine these
“truths” and find the conventional wisdom does not stand up to empirical tests. Finally, we show
how Congress easily worked around new rules concerning the addition of earmarks at the conference stage.
KEYWORDS: Congress, earmarks, pork, appropriations
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From the $223 million to build a “Bridge to Nowhere” to the $3 million
spent on studying bear DNA, pork barrel projects generate quite a bit of attention.
In the recently enacted $787 billion stimulus legislation, policymakers clashed
over the inclusion of earmarks. Although the Washington Post and President
Obama, among others, declared the bill free of “traditional” earmarks—funding
for a project inserted by a lawmaker bypassing the normal budgeting process—
others, most notably congressional Republicans, pointed toward what they viewed
as billions of dollars in wasteful spending in the legislation.1 The issue of pork
barrel spending and earmarks also emerged as a contentious issue during the 2008
presidential campaign. Newspapers frequently run stories with headlines like
“Pork Reform Drowned in Gravy” or “Bailout Dish has a Heaping Side of Pork,”
and several watchdog groups exist almost exclusively to monitor and advocate the
limitation of wasteful government spending.2 Negative publicity arising from
recent lobbying scandals, in tandem with the work of outside groups and a small
band of congressional reformers, have caused something of a backlash from the
public and have prompted Congress to look into reforms of the process by which
members add earmarks to appropriations bills.
According to Citizens Against Government Waste (CAGW), a fiscal
watchdog group whose mission is to “eliminate waste, mismanagement, and
inefficiency in the federal government,” appropriators have tacked more than
100,849 earmarks worth more than $290 billion onto spending legislation since
1991.3 In 2005, the number of earmarks included in appropriations bills peaked at
a record 13,492 projects carrying a price tag exceeding $27.3 billion. For the
2006 budget, Congress reduced the number of projects to 9,963 but increased the
dollar amount to $29 billion. In 2007, just two of the regular appropriations bills
were passed but legislators still managed to include over 2,500 projects worth
$13.2 billion. For fiscal year (FY) 2008, Congress appropriated just over $17.2
billion dollars for earmarked projects. The most recent appropriations cycle
marks a continuation of legislators’ earmarking ways—the legislation contains
more than 10,160 earmarks worth about $19.6 billion. In addition, according to
Congressional Quarterly, more than 100 House members requested earmarks in
the spending bill for clients of the PMA group, a lobbying firm currently under
investigation by the FBI. 4 The increasing trend in earmarks, coupled with other
1

Dan Eggen and Ellen Nakashima, “Despite Pledges, Package Has Some Pork,” Washington Post,
13 February, 2009; “See No Earmarks,” Wall Street Journal, 5 March, 2009.
2
Brian Riedl, “Pork Reform Drowned in Gravy,” The Washington Times, 2 December, 2007; Juan
Gonzalez, “Bailout Dish has a Heaping Side of Pork,” New York Daily News, 3 October, 2008.
3
CAGW’s mission statement and earmark data are available at the following URLs, respectively:
http://www.cagw.org/site/PageServer?pagename=about_Mission_History and http://www.cagw.
org/site/PageServer?pagename=reports_porkbarrelreport#trends (accessed October 28, 2008).
4
Jonathan Allen, “House to Vote on Earmark Ethics Probe as PMA Clients Show up in Omnibus,”
CQ Politics, 24 February, 2009.
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scandals involving lobbyists and elected officials, has led to a renewed campaign
against earmarks by the media, groups like CAGW and Taxpayers for Common
Sense, and Republican politicians like Arizona’s Jeff Flake and John McCain as
well as Senators Jim DeMint (SC) and Tom Coburn (OK).
In this article, we consider three common assertions that arise in the public
discourse relating to pork. Our aim is not to stake out a pro or con position on
pork in general, but rather to bring to bear recent data and in the process
demonstrate some fallacies in the perceptions of policymakers and journalists.
First, we look at the scope of earmarking within the broader context of federal
spending. Next, we examine the degree to which omnibus legislation contributes
to the rise in pork barrel spending that has occurred over roughly the past decade.
Third, we consider the practice of “airdropping” projects in conference
committees, which has recently come to light as one of the more controversial
aspects of earmarking. Additionally, we use a short case study of the fiscal year
2008 defense appropriations bill to demonstrate how the recent reforms instituted
by Congress did little to address the supposed problems with adding pork-barrel
projects at the conference stage of the appropriations process.
Pork Barrel Spending and the Deficit
An oft-heard criticism of earmarks is that their procurement elicits a tendency to
“damn the deficit, and pile on the pork.”5 Headlines such as this perpetuate the
notion that pork projects attached to appropriations bills are a major contributor, if
not the driving force, behind budget deficits and the burgeoning national debt.
The media dutifully record the requests made by legislators, indicating that when
tallied, the demand for pork has led to wasteful spending at the expense of
pressing national issues.6 Negative perceptions of pork are only exacerbated by
reporting of the most obscure and seemingly profligate projects.
Of course, one difficulty with studying pork is trying to differentiate
between wasteful spending and important projects, and it is not our intention or
purpose to differentiate between efficient and inefficient government spending.
To help solve the problem of identifying what is and what is not a pork project,
we depend on earmark data from CAGW. Since 1991, CAGW has released an
annual report summarizing the pork-barrel projects contained in the assorted
appropriations bills that fund the various activities of the federal government.
According to CAGW’s definition, “a ‘pork’ project is a line-item in an
appropriations bill that designates tax dollars for a specific purpose in
circumvention of established budgetary procedures.” In order to be included in
the annual report, a project must meet at least two of the following criteria:
5
6

Jennifer Drew, “Damn the Deficit, and Pile on the Pork,” Business Week, 9 May, 2005.
Carl Hulse, “Congress Continues Its Pursuit of Earmarks,” New York Times, 20 December, 2007.
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requested by only one chamber of Congress, not specifically authorized, not
competitively awarded, not requested by the president, greatly exceed the
president’s budget request or the previous year’s funding, not the subject of
congressional hearings, or serve only a local or special interest. CAGW notes that
theirs is not a comprehensive list of earmarks, in that earmarks, which designate
funds for a specific beneficiary or locality, may or may not be included via
established budgetary procedures.7 However, the media and politicians frequently
rely on these data when discussing the problems with earmarks so it is only
reasonable to use these data to test their assertions.
Unsurprisingly, members of Congress frequently state that any dollar
spent in their district is vital for their constituents and everything else is just
wasting taxpayer dollars. The media and watchdog groups frequently report
specific and imprudent uses of earmarks by individual legislators, providing
ammunition for claims of flagrant abuse and attention given to particularized
constituencies. News articles and editorials constantly emphasize earmarks like
one by Rep. David Hobson (R–OH) included in the FY2008 omnibus package.
His earmark designated $800,000 for a Speedway SuperAmerica gas station,
convenience store, and pizza parlor. When asked to justify the earmark, he
described it as a “‘vitally important’ need in the community ‘with hundreds of
college students and no pizza delivery or nearby fast food options.’”8 In another
example, Sen. Judd Gregg (R–NH) defended the $18 million he secured for the
Dartmouth Institute for Information Infrastructure Protection by calling the
project “an important component in our overall counterterrorism preparedness.”9
Another approach frequently adopted by critics of earmarks is to point out
instances in which legislators seem to not only approve of pork, but also boast of
their ability to obtain particularistic spending. A member of Congress frequently
cited as a brazen abuser of earmarks is Rep. John Murtha (D–PA), chair of the
Defense Appropriations subcommittee, requestor of $162 million in earmarks in
2007 alone, and “Pork King” according to editorial writers. The depiction of Mr.
Murtha’s actions is anything but flattering: while “procuring eye-popping chunks
of pork…he exudes pride, not embarrassment, for delivering hundreds of millions
of dollars in largesse to district beneficiaries. They, in turn, requite with hundreds
of thousands of dollars in campaign donations.”10

7

Congressional scholarship has defined pork—or distributive politics—in a variety of ways. For
instance, Stein and Bickers (1995) look at programmatic policies that distribute federal funds,
while Lee (2000) examines formulas setting the state-by-state allocation of federal highway funds.
8
Michael Franc, “An End to Earmarks? It is Possible,” The Weekly Standard, 8 January, 2008.
9
Carl Hulse, “Spending Bill Is Approved, With Its Storehouse of Pork,” New York Times, 14
February, 2003.
10
“The Pork King Keeps His Crown,” New York Times, 14 January, 2008.
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Finally, as evidenced by the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of
2008, more commonly known as the Wall Street bailout bill, earmarks are
perceived by the media as deal breakers in the legislative process. With the
bailout, the media credits the switch of fifty-eight representatives to favoring the
second version of the bill to the addition of “sweeteners designed to increase
support among Republicans.”11 Similarly, passage of the bill in the Senate was
accredited to the inclusion of such constituent-specific tax breaks as exemptions
for the production of children’s wooden arrows and write-offs for NASCAR track
owners.12 Including such provision gives members incentives to support a bill
they might not otherwise agree with.
In sum, portrayals of earmarks tend to be characterized by a general
negativity toward them and a focus on the sensational cases, which in turn fuels
the perception of a negative relationship between earmarks and fiscal restraint.
But to what extent are potentially unjustified projects—or, for that matter,
earmarks as a whole—at the root of U.S. budgetary woes? When we look at the
total amount of earmarks in comparison to the federal budget and the annual
deficit, we see that earmarks account for very little of total spending. Figure 1
plots the amount of pork (as defined by CAGW) along with federal outlays and
the size of the deficit from 1991-2008. In addition, we present spending on
Defense as well as Medicare and Social Security. If we compare the size of the
budget with the amount of pork, the total budget clearly trumps pork dollars by
several orders of magnitude since we can measure total outlays in trillions of
dollars and pork spending has yet to exceed $30 billion. The figure also
demonstrates that the size of the deficit and the amount of pork in a given year are
not directly related to one another. In fact, the correlation between pork and the
size of the deficit is -0.09. Of course, this is not to say that earmarks are not
contributing to the size of the deficit, only that any contribution is minimal.
Another way to think about earmarks is to consider their portion of federal
spending in relation to particular programs and outlays. For 2008, discretionary
spending (set annually by Congress) was approximately $1.1 trillion, while
entitlement spending (required by law) was more than $1.5 trillion. Spending on
interest alone surpassed $240 billion, which in tandem with discretionary and
entitlement spending brought the total budget to $2.9 trillion.

11

Sean Lengell and S.A. Miller, “Bush Signs Wall Street Bailout,” The Washington Times, 4
October, 2008.
12
“Top 10 Tax Sweeteners in the Bailout Bill,” Taxpayers for Common Sense, http://www.
taxpayer.net/resources.php?category=&type=Project&proj_id=1429&action=Headlines%20By%2
0TCS (accessed February 24, 2009).
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Figure 1 – Pork, Federal Outlays and the Budget Deficit
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Source - OMB for budget data and CAGW for pork data

When we look at specific programs, we find that funding Social Security
required $610 billion and means-tested entitlements (including programs such as
Medicaid) more than $390 billion. Over time, we see that spending for Defense
and Medicare and Social Security is not only significantly greater than the amount
of pork dollars but that it is also increasing at a greater rate. From the figure, it
appears that spending on these two areas began to rise more quickly after FY2000
while pork spending remained comparatively even. Even Foreign Aid, which in
comparison is just a drop in the bucket at around $35 billion, far exceeded the
total spending due to earmarks of $17.2 billion in 2008.13 Thus, to pin
overspending and rising budget deficits on pork barrel spending is a severe
overstatement since the latter made up about one-half of one percent of the $2.9
trillion spent by the federal government in the 2008 fiscal year and has never been
more than 1.1 percent of total outlays. These observations are reinforced by the
work of Lee (2005), who tracked earmarking in appropriations with total
government outlays from 1992-2003 and found that expenditures for programs
most likely to be secured through pork (transportation, water projects, community
13

All federal budget data are from U.S. Office of Management and Budget (2008).
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and regional development) have declined as a proportion of GDP. While
increasing levels of pork may be symptomatic of a larger government spending
problem, they are not the underlying cause.
Omnibus Legislation
Members of Congress and pundits alike often bemoan omnibus appropriations
legislation, calling these combined spending packages “Christmas tree bills”
because they include something for everyone.14 Accounts often imply that
omnibus bills foster an environment that promotes unbridled earmarking because
the catch-all structure allows legislators to attach earmarks without having to
worry about public or legislative scrutiny. Writing for the Washington Times,
Donald Lambro described the omnibus as a “catchall spending package that has
been used to hide tens of billions of dollars in wasteful pork, mysteriously tucked
into its opaque provisions.”15 David Williams, vice president of policy for
CAGW, condemned the 2008 measure, calling it “totally fiscally irresponsible to
lump everything together in one spending bill and put it to a vote less than 24
hours later.”16
Political scientists have also documented the rise in the use of omnibus
legislation, addressing its proposed advantages and disadvantages. Scholars
identified a trend towards omnibus legislating since the 1950s (Baumgartner et al.
1997; Howell et al. 2000; Mayhew 1991), with a majority appearing in the 1980s
(Krutz 2001a). Krutz (2001b) finds that using the vehicle of omnibus legislation
allows for eased passage during times of divided government and tight budgetary
concerns. The drawbacks of these attachment practices have also been
documented, with the most frequent complaint stemming from legislators being
unacquainted with the details contained within the massive bills (Sinclair 1997;
Smith 1989). However, as Hall (1996) documents, only a handful of legislators
are typically involved in the committee drafting and deliberation of most pieces of
legislation that move forward in the conventional way as individual, stand-alone
bills. Furthermore, in point of fact, in many cases the individual appropriations
bills that eventually get rolled into an omnibus were subject to separate votes
when they first passed the House and Senate under the normal order of business.

14

For eighteen of the past thirty-one years (fiscal years 1977 to 2007), Congress condensed two or
more of the regular appropriations bills into one large measure, or, as with FY2001, the bills were
partitioned into two minibus bills (Streeter 1997).
15
Donald Lambro, “Trimming the Fat from the Pork,” Washington Post, 18 December, 2006.
16
Paul Singer and Tory Newmyer, “Nearly 9,000 Earmark Requests in Omnibus,” Roll Call, 18
December, 2007. http://www.rollcall.com/issues/53_73/news/21419-1.html (accessed November
2, 2008).
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Again, we do not disagree with the assessment that omnibus bills include
wasteful spending or that members may not have time to read over the legislation
line by line. However, after examining the evidence, we disagree with the notion
that omnibus bills bring about extra spending and that there would be
substantively less pork if Congress passed the appropriations bills under “regular
order.” Rather than pointing to instances where dubious projects were included in
omnibus legislation or simply citing the total amount of pork included in an
omnibus bill, we look at the data separately for all appropriation bills from 1997
through 2008.
In Figure 2, we compare the appropriations bills across years in which
they were included in an omnibus package with the years when they were passed
on their own. The size of the box indicates the amount of pork while the shading
identifies bills that were included in an omnibus package. Compared to cases in
which Congress passed individual bills in the conventional fashion, when we look
at spending bill by bill and over time, the amount of earmarked money depends
very little on the legislative vehicle. To see this, compare the size of the shaded
boxes with the empty boxes for each bill across the years. For example, in 2002
Figure 2 – Earmarks and Omnibus Appropriations
Agriculture
Commerce et al.
DC (until 2006)
Defense
Energy & Water
State/Foreign Ops
Homeland Security
Interior
Labor/HHS
Legislative Branch
Military Constr/VA
Transportation/HUD
Treasury (until 2004)
VA/HUD (until 2006)
Omnibus
1997

1998

1999

2000

Separate Bill

2001

2002

2003

Fiscal Year

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

Included in Omnibus Package
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Congress passed each of the bills separately while in 2003 many of the regular
appropriations bills were included in an omnibus bill.17 If we compare the
amount of pork in the Transportation Appropriations Bill in 2002 with the amount
in 2003, there is actually a decline of roughly 17 percent (to about $3.5 billion).
The same general pattern of little to no positive growth stands if we were to
compare the amount of pork in the other appropriations bills. Over the time series
presented here, only the Energy and Treasury bills included significantly more
pork when they were included in an omnibus package (p < .05) and one bill,
Interior, actually had slightly more pork when passed on its own (p < .10). It
seems that omnibus bills are laden with pork because they are composed of
multiple bills, each with a substantial amount of pork. In fact, the bill with the
most pork (Defense) rarely ends up in omnibus packages. Thus, if limiting
earmarks is the goal, critics would probably be better served by focusing on pork
advanced in congressional committees long before the appropriations end-game.
We should be clear to note that direct spending allocated to districts is not
the only way members of Congress can send pork back to their districts.
Legislators can also utilize narrowly tailored tax credits to advantage their
constituents. These tax breaks can be more valuable than project funding for
some non-defense corporate interests.18 For example, in the most recent stimulus
package, legislators evaded President Obama’s call to pass the plan earmark-free
by artfully crafting the language of tax exemptions and new programs. Insurance
tax credit provisions illustrate this—while appearing broad, the credits are only
for companies employing recreation boats longer than 65 feet, seemingly
benefiting those working on cruise ships, which happen to comprise a sizeable
contingent within Rep. Debbie Wasserman Schultz’s (D–FL) constituency.19 Of
course, measuring the money lost through tax breaks is much harder compared to
adding up projects inserted into spending bills. This is why we focus on spending
rather than tax breaks in this article.
Airdrops from Conference Committees
The third myth advanced by pundits and advocacy groups is that secretive and
quick-moving “airdropped” earmarks added at the conference stage compound the
17

As indicated in Figure 2, the jurisdictions of the appropriations subcommittees have been altered
periodically over the period examined here. The data reflect earmarks as reported by Citizens
Against Government Waste transformed to constant 2008 dollars. Congress failed to pass nine of
the regular appropriations bills for 2007.
18
We thank the anonymous reviewers and editors for raising this point.
19
Michael Grabell and Christopher Weaver. “In the Stimulus Bill: An Earmark by Any Other
Name,” ProPublica, 5 February, 2009, http://www.propublica.org/feature/welcome-in-the-stimulus
-bill-an-earmark-by-any-other-name (accessed February 24, 2009).
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problem of pork. Currently, congressional rules attempt to prohibit the addition
of new spending in conference committees, but as Rep. Jeff Flake (R–AZ) notes
“every rule we have can be waived, and we do.” The problem the media and
watchdog groups have with airdropping is that the process is seen as “quick and
secretive” with “virtually no accountability for lawmakers.” Steve Ellis of
Taxpayers for Common Sense maintains that “there is not an opportunity to
scrutinize them because things go like greased lightning.”20 These earmarks,
stemming from the conference committees’ reconciliation of the House and
Senate versions of the appropriations bills, have been portrayed by the media as
adding to the growing amount of pork in the original appropriations bills, often
times being included only to benefit vulnerable members.21 A major criticism is
that these types of earmarks are not subject to public comment or legislative
review through the hearing process. While the appropriations committees hold
public hearings and mark-up sessions, the real work in conference committees
happens behind closed doors. Despite such strong assertions, we find little
support for the claim that “airdrops” are the reason for bloated spending bills.
Figure 3 is a series of pie charts that illustrate earmark dollars by chamber
for FY1995-2007.22 When broken down by year we see that in only two years
have conference committees accounted for more that 25 percent of total dollars
spent on earmarks (FY1995 and FY2006). On average, 16 percent of total pork
spending was added in the conference stage. So, while the dollar amounts vary
from fiscal year to fiscal year and between the two chambers, the amount of
earmarks arising from conference deliberation never surpasses the amount coming
from the appropriations committees. Because the only way to prohibit such
earmarks from being attached to the final bill is to vote against the conference
report, a costly move considering the importance of passing appropriations bills, it
seems justifiable that members express concern with the use of such “airdropping
tactics.” Yet, however reckless the practice, our results suggests it is misguided to
blame conference committees for the amount of pork barrel spending—the
individual committees in the respective chambers are responsible for the bulk of
earmarks.

20

Kristen B. Mitchell, “Earmarks, Quick as a Wink,” The Herald Tribune, 5 October, 2008,
http://www.heraldtribune.com/article/20081005/ARTICLE/810050351 (accessed November 2,
2008).
21
Kevin Bogardus, “Earmarks ‘airdropped’ for Freshman,” The Hill, 15 November, 2007,
http://thehill.com/business--lobby/earmarks-airdropped-for-freshmen-2007-11-15.html (accessed
November 2, 2008).
22
CAGW did not designate chamber of origin for the FY2008 bill.
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Figure 3 – Percent of Earmarks Dollars by Chamber
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The Political Challenges to Earmark Reform
Based on the data reported above—identifying the sources and scope of
earmarks—we can conclude that earmarks are nowhere near the chief cause of
problematic budgets and spending practices. We also show that most earmarks
are not “airdropped” at the conference stage, but rather they go through the
normal legislative process. Nevertheless, there have been continued calls for
earmark reform by elected officials and budgetary watchdog groups, especially in
light of recent scandals. For example, Roy Blunt (R–MO) called for “systemwide reform” and stated that “…for far too long members have dropped earmarks
into bills in the dark of night.”23 CAGW also released a report detailing how
Congress should reform the appropriations process.24 Many of these proposals
23

The Office of the Republican Whip, “Blunt Calls for Democrats to Join Republicans in Earmark
Reform.” Press release, 29 January, 2008, http://republicanwhip.house.gov/News/Document
Single.aspx?DocumentID=82809 (accessed October 29, 2008).
24
Tom Finnigan, “All about Pork: The Abuse of Earmarks and the Need for Reform.” Citizens
Against Government Waste, 7 March, 2007, http://www.cagw.org/site/PageServer?pagename=
reports_earmarks (accessed November 2, 2008).
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demanded increased disclosure and mechanisms for lawmakers to eliminate
earmarks added in conference.
In 2007, both the House and the Senate succumbed to the pressure and
passed several new rules governing the procedures of the appropriations process,
specifically addressing issues such as transparency and earmarks added in
conference. In this section, we will detail the new reforms and then show, by
examining the case of the FY2008 Defense Appropriations Bill, how Congress
easily worked around the new rules regarding adding earmarks in conference.25
The House adopted the earmark reforms as part of H.Res. 6, the rules
package for the 110th Congress, as well as H.Res. 491, while the Senate included
their reforms in S. 1, the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007.
The new rules in both chambers require a listing of earmarks and their sponsors
and also detail how a bill can be delayed if the list of earmarks and sponsors is not
available—basically, by allowing a member to raise a point of order against
consideration of the legislation or conference report. The House rules also
included a specific provision aimed at making it difficult to bypass the new
reforms by not allowing blanket waivers of points of order in special rules.26
In terms of conference committees, the House now requires that a listing
of any new earmarks added in conference be included in the conference report
and the joint explanatory statement. The Senate rules on “air drops” appear to be
stricter since they do not allow the addition of new earmarks to the conference
report.27 However, and this is why the new rules are essentially meaningless, they
appear to be silent on including new earmarks as part of the joint explanatory
statement. Technically, the conference report contains the text that will reconcile
the differences between the legislation that passed in the House and Senate while
the explanatory statement describes the conference report. The respective
chambers vote on the conference report, but not the explanatory statement. As the
following case will demonstrate, the difference between the two reports allowed
the Senate to get around its new rules.
The new rules were tested when Congress decided to move forward with
the conference proceedings for the FY2008 Defense Appropriations Bill. The
agreement reported by the conference committee on November 6, 2007 included
24 new earmarks worth $59 million (Congressional Record (hereafter, CR) 2007,
25

For even more details about conference reports and the new earmark rules see Schneider (1999),
Bach (2001), and Rybicki (2007a, b).
26
Most special rules in the House include a waiver of all points of order. If a member raises a
point of order on the special rule for the appropriations bill, then it is resolved with a vote on the
question of consideration, not the normal ruling from the chair.
27
The new rules allow a Senator to object to an earmark added in the conference report by raising
a point of order. The Senate can then strike the earmark from the report without rejecting the
entire committee recommendation (by the Presiding Officer sustaining the point of order) but the
House must then agree to the newly changed conference report.
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H13312) but listed them in the joint explanatory statement, not in the conference
report. On the 7th, the Rules Committee reported a special rule, H.Res. 806, that
called for consideration of the conference report and included a waiver of all
points of order against the report and consideration. This blanket waiver stood in
clear violation of the new reforms that specifically stated that it is not in order to
consider a rule that waives the requirement that new earmarks added in
conference be made public.28
On the 8th, the House took up H.Res. 806 and Rep. Flake (R–AZ) quickly
raised a point of order against the rule because it waived all points of order
against the conference report. Rep. Slaughter (D–NY), chair of the Committee on
Rules, defended the rule by arguing that the report properly disclosed all new
earmarks. After some debate, the House voted on the question of consideration,
which passed 220-191 largely along party lines (CR 2007, H13311-13314). The
House then moved the previous question and passed the special rule, again with
party line votes. Finally, the House voted to pass the conference report with 400
voting aye and only 15 against. So, even though the special rule clearly violated
the new reform, the House easily bypassed it with a simple majority vote.
Later that same day, the Senate also moved to consider the conference
report. However, since the report and not the joint explanatory statement that
included the new earmarks was under consideration, there was no easy
parliamentary redress to strip out the newly funded projects. Senator McCaskill
(D–MO) summed up the objections to the conference report:
Unfortunately, I have since discovered there are still some gaps in
the ethics bill that need to be filled. One of which has to do with
the difficulty of raising a 60-vote point of order on earmarks added
during appropriations conference negotiations. S.1 says that we
can do that. But in reality, we really can’t. Most of these added
funding earmarks are contained in the Joint Explanatory Statement
of Managers, which, technically, isn’t part of the conference report
bill text. What that means is we can’t raise a point of order against
those earmarks to strike them out of the bill (CR 2007, S14147).
The Senate proceeded to pass the conference report with a voice vote and it
moved on to the President.
Thus, it appears that in response to the “problem” of airdrops, the Senate
passed a solution with no teeth and the new reforms did not have the (publiclystated) intended consequences. The only real outcome of the reforms is a list of
names attached to the appropriations bills designating who requested the
earmarks. It is unlikely that any member will see this as a drawback because most

28

Specifically House Rule XXI, clause 9.
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already proudly report the money they are sending home to their districts in
newsletters and press releases.
Earmarks for Fiscal Year 2009
In the most recent round of the appropriations process, members of both parties
continued to include special projects in the individual bills funding government
operations for FY 2009—$19.6 billion worth of earmarks in all, which represents
an increase of $2.4 billion over the previous year. Figure 4 shows the totals for
each of the separate bills. Three of the bills—Defense, Homeland Security, and
Military Construction—passed as separate bills while the others were included in
Figure 4 – 2009 Appropriations Earmarks

Agriculture

$351.1m

Commerce et al.

$936.8m

Defense

$11.2b

Energy & Water

$2.2b

Financial Services

$145.9m

Homeland Security

$229.6m

Interior

$433.7m

Labor/HHS

$1b

Legislative Branch

$0.38m

Military Construction/VA

$1.3b

State/Foreign Ops

$256m

Transportation/HUD

$1.5b

0

5,000
Millions of Dollars
Separate Bill

10,000

Included in Omnibus Package

Earmarks as reported by Citizens Against Government Waste

an omnibus appropriations package.29 Similar to previous years, the Defense bill
included the greatest amount of earmarks dollars followed by Energy and Water,
Transportation, and Military Construction. The $11.2 billion in the Defense bill
29

The list of earmarks in the FY2009 bills was not released in time to include in our other
analyses.
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represents a massive increase over the $7.3 billion added in fiscal year 2008, and
although the new earmark reforms require members to claim earmarks, just over
half of the dollars spent in the Defense bill were not linked with a particular
member of Congress. In terms of trends, the dollar amount of earmarks went up
from last year in five bills (Defense, Financial Services, Interior, Military
Construction/VA, State/Foreign Operations), decreased in six bills (Agriculture,
Commerce, Energy and Water, Homeland Security, Legislative Branch,
Transportation/HUD), and remained the same in one bill (Labor/HHS). Because
spending increased in some bills but decreased in others, it is difficult to speculate
as to whether or not members are succumbing to the pressure to reduce the
amount of earmarks.
Discussion and Conclusion
Myths propagated by the media, reformers, and outside groups surrounding the
use of earmarks in the appropriations process paint a very grim picture for fiscal
responsibility. Despite the large dollar amounts appropriated and questions
surrounding the distributive practices under which decisions are made, the
discourse surrounding earmarks seems to be focusing on the wrong issues.
Earmarks are not responsible for the burgeoning national debt. “Airdropped”
earmarks originating for the first time in conference committees, or pork added in
omnibus packages, are not the places from which the lion’s share of pork stems.
To the degree that reform is warranted and practical, critiques of earmarks should
be redirected to earlier in the budget process, starting with the appropriations
committees and subcommittees. It is here, where the bulk of legislating occurs,
that most earmarks are added to legislation. While much of the rhetoric regarding
pork—in terms of its scope and the manner in which it is perpetuated later in the
legislative process—is misguided, we do agree with the comments by some
interest groups and members such as Senator Jim DeMint (R–SC) that earmarks
help to “grease the skids for the passage of bloated spending bills.”30 Members of
Congress reap electoral rewards for pork, and it is not surprising that they are
disinclined to vote against measures containing goodies for their district.

30

The Office of Senator Jim DeMint, Issues and Legislation, "Wasteful Spending," Press release,
http://demint.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Issues.Detail&Issue_id=3e3393d1-799346e4-919f-7c95185c71a8 (accessed October 29, 2008).
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